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INTRODUCTION

On October 2, 1995, the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslavian
War Crimes Tribunal' issued a decision of considerable moment
for the future growth of international law. In Decision on the Defence Motion for InterlocutoryAppeal on Jurisdictionin the Matter
of Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,2 the Appeals Chamber was confronted with a series of arguments designed to divest it of subject
matter jurisdiction over the war crimes process. Dusko Tadic, currently one of the leading defendants in the proceedings, contended
that:
(i) The United Nations Security Council was without jurisdiction to establish a war crimes tribunal as an aspect of its enforcement powers, since Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
(wherein the Security Council's jurisdictional competence is
* B.A., 1969, Columbia College; J.D., 1973, Vanderbilt University School of Law; LL.M,
1984 New York University Law School. Mr. von Sternberg is the Supervising Attorney for
the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. for the Northeast Region.
1 See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. 5/INF/49
(1994). By resolution dated February 22, 1993, the U.N. Security Council decided to establish an international war crimes tribunal with the objective of prosecuting and, where appropriate, sanctioning certain violations of international humanitarian law deemed to have
taken place in the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Id.; see also Security Council Resolution
on Establishingan International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territorry of the
Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48 h Sess. Res. & Dec., at 29, U.N. Doc. S1
INF/49, 3217' mtg. (May 25, 1993), available in 32 I.L.M. 1203, 1203-1204 (1993). The
appeal taken by Dusko Tadic was from a judgement of the Trial Chamber of the Yugoslavian War Crimes Tribunal. Id.; Secretary-General'sReport on Aspects of Establishingan
InternationalTribunal for the Prosecutionof Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territorryof the Former Yugoslavia,
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993), reprintedin 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1163-84 (1993).
2 Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 1995), reprintedin 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996) [hereinafter "Tadic
Appeal"].
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detailed) does not specifically confer the authority to set up a
judicial or adjudicative body.
(ii) In all events, although the Tribunal may have the authority to criminally administer international humanitarian law
in the case of an international conflict, no such jurisdiction
existed
where the misconduct occurred in a civil or internal
4
war.

The Appeals Chamber ruled against appellant Tadic on both of
these issues. Its opinion upheld the authority of the Security
Council to establish a judicial body under Chapter V11 5 and to
criminally enforce humanitarian law in the area of internal conflicts;6 both of which are decisions of first impression in the field of
public international law. This article purports to explore the significance of the holdings in the context of two broad policy considerations. First, the relationship between enforcing international
humanitarian law and the Security Council's goal of pursuing collective peace and security is considered. This paper then analyzes
the scope of customary international humanitarian law as determined by the Appeals Chamber.
3 Id. at pars. 11-12, reprintedin 35 I.L.M. 32, 39. On its original Trial Chamber motion,
appellant had asserted a three-pronged attack in challenging the Tribunal's jurisdiction,
alleging the "(a) illegal foundation of the International Tribunal; (b) wrongful primacy of
the International Tribunal over national courts; [and] (c) lack ofjurisdiction ratione materiae." Id. at par. 2, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 32 (quoting appellant's Defence Motion on
Jurisdictionin the TrialChamber of the InternationalCourt, 10 Aug. 1995 (Case No. IT-941-T)).
4 See Tadic Appeal, supra note 2, at par. 35, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 44.
5 Id. at pars. 13-24, available in 32 I.L.M. at 39, 40. The Appeals Chamber recognized
the "[power of the Security Council to invoke Chapter VIII" in promulgating the Tribunal
and imbuing it with the requisite authority and jurisdiction in keeping with international
law norms:
Article 39 opens Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and determines the
conditions of application of this Chapter. It provides that "[the Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security."
Id. at par. 35, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 42 (quoting U.N. CHARTER, art 39). The Appeals
Chamber concluded "that the... Tribunal ha[d] been established in accordance with the
appropriate procedures under the United Nations Charter and provide[d] all the necessary
safeguards of a fair trial. [Hence, as it was] . . . thus 'established by law' . . . [t]he first
ground of appeal: unlawful establishment of the International Tribunal, [was] . . . accordingly dismissed." Id. at par. 47, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 48.
6 See Tadic Appeal, supra note 2, at pars. 35-71, reprintedin 32 I.L.M. at 44-45; see also
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, 12 Aug. 1949, art. 5, 75 U.N.T.S. 970; Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 Aug. 1949, art. 5, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 Aug. 1949, art. 6, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
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These policy considerations and jurisdictional issues are examined, taking into consideration the recent jurisprudential shift
away from regulating the rights of sovereign states inter sese, to a
corresponding emphasis on protecting human rights of individuals
within the international community. With respect to the maintenance of world peace and security, there has been a decline in the
importance of the law governing aggression (the jus ad bellum)
and a corresponding emphasis on protecting human rights in
armed conflict (the jus in bello).7 The new analysis symbolizes a
jurisprudential shift away from regulating the rights of sovereign
states inter sese, to a corresponding emphasis on protecting the
human rights of individuals within the international community.8
This new jurisprudence does not approach the problem of collective security from the conventional dualistic perception of international law, under which international norms reach individuals
only through the medium of the State's legal machinery. Rather,
the problem is addressed by means of an essentially monist view
in which international jurisprudence has both primacy and direct
control over human rights violations.9 Successfully addressing collective security through a direct application of humanitarian
norms reflect a holistic reading of international law, emphasizing
the rights of individuals and groups (rather than those of States)
within a modern system. 10 It is submitted that the increasing at7 See Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (the 1949 Geneva Convention). The issue of "proportionality" as it relates to balancing concepts ofjus in bello and jus ad bellum is addressed
by Protocol I. Id. See generally MYREs M. McDoUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND
MINIMUYM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 241-44 (1961); JAMES T. JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION
AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR 203, 204 (1981).
8 The law of human rights and humanitarian law evolved separately. See generally DIETRICH SCHINDLER, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37 (International Committee of the Red Cross 1979). It is only in the course of time, and
particularly after the Second World War, that these two bodies of jurisprudence have converged. Id. at 7-9. The United Nations now views human rights and international humanitarian law as having a formal nexus. Id. See generally Respect for Human Rights in Armed
Conflict, Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/7120 (1969) [hereinafter Respect for
Human Rights in Armed Conflict]. This Report was prepared pursuant to G.A. Res. 2444
(XXIII), U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969).
9 On the differences between the dualistic and monist approaches to international law,
see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 32-35 (4th ed. 1990). See also
William V. O'Brien, Teaching HumanitarianLaw in Universities and Law Schools-The
Jus in Bello in InternationalRelation Studies, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 1011, 1013 (1982) (discussing how "jusin bello" was downplayed to promote adoption of 'jus ad bellum' ensuring
peaceful settlement of disputes and maintenance of peace through collective security
agreements).
10 The application of humanitarian norms evincing an emphasis on the rights of individuals as opposed to groups can also be classified as non-derogable rules of international law,
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tractiveness of this approach must be understood as part of the
quest for a new humanitarian order which integrates the law of
peace with human rights and humanitarian law considerations."
An integral aspect of the new humanitarian order is the emerging doctrine ofjus cogens. 1 2 Jus cogens represents the highest category of customary law.13 The advent of this doctrine constitutes a
clear departure from the prevailing view held by the community of
States that international law may be set aside when conflicting
i.e., "peremptory" norms or "juscogens". OPPENHEII'S INTERNATIONAL LAw § 2, at 7-8 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). Such "peremptory" norms have also been
described as "[s]itting atop the hierarchy of international law... "Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1121 (1995).
Moreover, "[bloth human rights and humanitarian law arise out of the respect for the
human dignity of the individual and reflect the need to protect the same, despite the historical differences in origins of these two branches of law." Richard D. Glick, Lip Service to the
Laws of War: HumanitarianLaw and United Nations Armed Forces, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L.
53, 62 n.15 (1995). Further, though there is no defined set of peremptory norms, those
listed in article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter can probably be interpreted as encompassing the
prohibition on the unlawful use of force in derogation of international humanitarian norms.
11 The term "New Humanitarian Order" has historically been associated with the right
of humanitarian initiative in man-made or natural disaster relief situations. See Jovica
Patrnogic, Some Reflections on HumanitarianPrinciples Applicable in Relief Actions, in
STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HuMANITARIAN LAw AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN

HONOR OF JEAN PICTET 925 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984). This essay, however, utilizes
the term in its broadest sense to signify the primacy of human rights and humanitarian
law as organizing principles of world order:
By "humanitarian order" the Jordanian Government clearly understood this term in a
broad sense to mean in this context the human values applicable to the entire international order, whether found in the moral conscience or the law, or underlying the institution of international organizational arrangements. As such, the call for a new international humanitarian order amounts to a call for review of the entire international
system of law and organization in the light and the re-affirmation of humanitarian
values and in response to contemporary needs.
Id.; see also Glick, supra note 10, at 60-62 (quoting Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41, Sales No. E/68.XIV.2 (1968) (Resolution XXIII: Human Rights in Armed Conflicts)).
12 In this paper, the term jus cogens is used interchangeably with such terms as "peremptory norms" and "fundamental human rights." See U.N. Conference on the Law of
Treaties, 1st and 2d Sess., Vienna Mar. 26-May 28, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONFJ39/lJ/Add. 2
(1971), Statement of Mr. Suarez (Mexico) at 294. While definitions have sometimes been
elusive, this term has been interpreted largely to mean "principles that the legal conscience
of mankind deems [s] absolutely essential to coexistence in the international community."
Id.; Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights,
12 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 411, 414-416 (1989). An excellent discussion of these
definitions is found therein. Id.; see also Lt. Colonel Elliott, 1993-APR. AaMY LAw. 19, 19
(1993). This author defines "juscogens" as a "norm of international law... from which no
deviation is permitted and differs from a rule of customary international law that depends
on the consent of states." Id. Jus cogens norms are not based on consent but on the fundamental values of all states. Id.; Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,
717 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993). The court characterized a state
officially engaging in practice of torture as violation ofjus cogens norms. Id.
13 See Parker & Neyon, supra note 12, at 416-17; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 9, at
513.
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municipal law-making exists. 4 Since rights recognized as jus
cogens are not derogable by States, their enforcement by the international community is a development of significant importance to
the monist conception of international law. 15
I.

JURISDICTION TO ESTABLISH A TRIBUNAL

Dusko Tadic's contention that the U.N. Security Council lacked
jurisdiction to establish a tribunal was easily defeated.' The
United Nations Charter sets out specific powers in connection
with what may properly be considered "enforcement action. " "
That such "enforcement action" may include military and economic enforcement measures, implies that the Security Council is
14 In this regard it has been asserted that the doctrinal development ofjus cogens has
not only been relevant to customary international law, but to the law of treaties as well. See
A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, As Illustrated by the War
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 18 (1995). A clear illustration of this on a
domestic level is Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law. Id. (citing RESTATEMEN r (THIRD) OF THE LAw OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 (1987)). Section 103 posits that jus
cogens rules "prevail over and invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with them." Id. at cmt.k.; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, (in force Jan. 27, 1980), available in 8 I.L.M.
679, 679 (1969). Similarly, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties established the
term most widely used currently: the description of "juscogens" as a set of "peremptory
norms of international law." Id.
15 See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1180 (describing peremptory norms); see also OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, § 2, 7-8 (classifying humanitarian norms emphasizing
rights of individuals as underogable rules of international law); W. Paul Gormley, The
Right to Life and the Rule of Non-Derogability:Peremptory Norms of Jus Cogens, in THE
RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 120, 122 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1985).
16 See Tadic Appeal, supra note 2, at par. 35, available in 32 I.L.M. 35, 36. In the Tadic
Appeal, the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal affirmed the Trial Chamber's
dismissal of "the appellant's motion insofar as it relate[d] to primacy jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction under Articles 2, 3 and 5 and otherwise decide[d the motion] to be
incompetent insofar as it challenge[d] the establishment of the International Tribunal." Id.
Reaffirming the Trial Chamber's decision, and further dismissing appellant Tadic's challenge to the Tribunal's appellate jurisdiction, the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal, noting
probable jurisdiction, observed that "Article 25 of the Statute of the International Tribunal
... opens up the possibility of appellate proceedings within the International Tribunal." Id.
at par. 4, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 37. Thus, the Appeals Chamber concluded 'that the
International Tribunal [indeed] ha[d] jurisdiction to examine the plea against its jurisdiction based on the invalidity of its establishment by the Security Council." Id. at par. 22,
reprintedin 32 I.L.M. at 41.
17 See U.N. CHARTER art. 41. Under the U.N. Charter, art. 41, enforcement actions set
forth by the U.N. Security Council include: "complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of all rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio or other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." Id.; U.N. CHARTER art. 42. Furthermore,
should such actions prove inadequate in the Security Council's estimation, the Security
Council may
take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade,
and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Member States of the United Nations.
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not limited to responding to the enumerated means when responding to threats to peace.'" The Appeals Chamber ruled to this effect, noting that the "appropriateness" of the means ultimately
adopted to secure legitimate ends was within the discretion of the
Security Council.' 9
The Tribunal's holding is not surprising. The Security Council
previously acted under Chapter VII in a variety of ways not specifically contemplated by Chapter VII, and its action has not been
questioned by Member States. One recent example of the Security
Council's humanitarian involvement, undertaken pursuant to
Chapter VII, was its resolutions during the Iraq-Kuwait conflict,
including a request for Iraq to comply with international humanitarian law. 2° A second example was the unanimous resolution
that obstacles to humanitarian assistance in Somalia created a
threat to world peace. 2 ' Yet another example was the banning of
18 See Tadic Appeal, supra note 2, at par. 33, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 35, 44 (describing
establishment of International Tribunal as "akin to emergency police action," operating as
'a holding operation" until things cooled down).
19 See id. at par. 19, available in 32 I.L.M. 40. The Security Council can exercise, within
certain constitutional limitations, a relatively wide breath of discretion in choosing what
remedy or course of action it will implement in the case of a serious threat to peace. Id.
Specifically:
...the Security Council has a broad discretion in deciding on the course of action and
evaluating the appropriateness of the measures to be taken. The language of Article 39
is quite clear as to the channelling of the very broad and exceptional powers of the
Security Council under Chapter VII through Articles 41 and 42. These two Articles
leave to the Security Council such a wide choice as not to warrant searching, on functional or other grounds, for even wider and more general powers than those already
expressly provided for in the Charter.
Id. at par. 31, reprintedin 32 I.L.M. 32, 42. Going on to describe these potential powers, the
Appeals Chamber interpreted them as being ".. . coercive vis-&-vis the culprit State or
entity. But they are also mandatory vis-&-vis the other Member States, who are under an
obligation to cooperate with the Organization ... and with one another ... in the implementation of the action or measures decided by the Security Council." Id. Consequently,
once "a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression" is determined to
exist, "the Security Council has a wide margin of discretion to choose the appropriate
course of action and to evaluate the suitability of the measures chosen, as well as their
potential contribution to the restoration or maintenance of peace." Id. at par. 32, reprinted
in 32 I.L.M. at 44. Again, the condition is that the Security Council's discretion under Article 39 is limited by Articles 41 and 42. Id.; see also S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48 t' Sess.,
Res. & Dec., 3217th mtg. at 29, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203,
1203-1204 (1993).
20 S.C. Res. 677, U.N. SCOR, 2951th mtg. (Oct. 29, 1990), reprintedin 29 I.L.M. 1560,
1564 (1990) (condemning Iraqi attempts to alter population of Kuwait); S.C. Res. 666, U.N.
SCOR, 2929' mtg. (Sept. 13, 1990).
21 S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 3145th mtg. (Dec. 3, 1992). See Mort Rosenblum, Somalia
Famine Avoidable, Aid Workers Say, L.A. Tims, Oct. 4, 1992, at A16. As a result of war
and drought, by late 1992, Somalia's neighbors had to contend with about one million of the
former's refugees; as its would-be leaders vied for military control, an estimated 25% of its
children were dead and another 1.5 million faced starvation. Id. Faced with these stark and
terrifying statistics, the U.N. Security Council finally took action through S.C. Res. 794,
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military flights in the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina, an essential factor in the delivery of humanitarian aid and an indispensable step in the cessation of hostilities.2 2
Despite these clear precedents and the unambiguous language
of the Charter, the Tribunal's jurisdictional determination fails to
address substantial questions. Although the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia has currently reached a tentative conclusion with the
adoption of the Dayton Accords, 23 a lingering question remains as
to whether this development will lead to initiatives to divest the
Tribunal of jurisdiction on the basis that the threat to peace and
security has ended. Another unanswered question is determining
the predicate for relieving a threat to the peace underlying the
Tribunal's formation and its mandate to enforce international humanitarian law.
The Tribunal's function remains a vital one, a fact made abundantly clear in a recent editorial by Sir Hartley Shawcross, the
chief British prosecutor at Nuremberg.2 4 Shawcross criticized the
decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization not to arrest
major suspected war criminals, noting that there can be no peaceful reconciliation unless the perpetrators are made individually
responsible for their actions.2 5
U.N. SCOR, 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992) Id.; Ana Puga, Somalia: A Nation at
the Abyss, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 16-17, 1992, at Al. It has been widely observed, however,
that from the outset, U.N. relief operations in Somalia were particularly troubled, due to
an inadequate humanitarian budget, absence of cooperation among U.N. agencies, and a
growing workload for the U.N., as conflict in the region worsened. Id.; Keith Richburg, U.N.
Envoy for Somalia Resigns Post, Blames Bureaucracy, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1992, at A31.
As a result of the U.N.'s delay and mounting instances of famine and death, Mohammed
Salnoun, U.N. Envoy for Somalia, resigned from his post in October of 1992. Id.
22 See S.C. Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 3122nd mtg. (October 9, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
1427, 1477-78 (1992); S.C. Res. 786, U.N. SCOR, 3133rd mtg. (Nov. 10, 1992) availablein
31 I.L.M. 1427, 1479 (1992). By adoption of Resolution 781, the U.N. Security Council
sought "to ensure the safety of humanitarian flights to Bosnia and Herzegovina" through
the ban of military flights in air space over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Id.
23 See Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
November. 10, 1995, reprintedin 35 I.L.M. 170, 172 (1996) [hereinafter Dayton Agreement]
(recognizing establishment of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as prerequisite to
peace in region); see also Peace Implementation Conference for the Bosnian General
Framework Agreement: Conclusions of the London Meeting, December 12, 1995, reprinted
in 35 I.L.M 223, 223 (1996) [hereinafter London Conference] (implementing Dayton Agreement); General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, December 14,
1995, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996) ("Framework Agreement"); cf Robin Knight, Can
There Be Justice as Well as Peace in Bosnia?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 4, 1995, at 30
(reporting that Milosevic agreed at Dayton peace talks to cooperate fully with U.N. War
Crimes Tribunal).
24 Hartley Shawcross, OrderNATO to Round Up Suspects Indicted for War Crimes, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., May 23, 1996, at 8.
25 Id. Shawcross pointed out that:
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Shawcross' comments address a major theme of this study. In
addition, they point out a considerable "hiatus" in the Appeals
Court's ruling in the Tadic case.28 A latent, but important source
of conflict is glossed over and ignored by the Appeals Chamber's
rationale that the "appropriateness" of the means is within the
virtually unreviewable discretion of the Security Council." The
causal nexus between enforcing international humanitarian law
and the goal of restoring collective security raises a question of
significance.28 Moreover, examination of this nexus would have
enhanced, rather than detracted from, the Tribunal's jurisdictional competence and its role as a Chapter VII court. It also
would have clarified the compelling nexus between the peace settlement crafted by the Dayton Accords and the need for human
rights enforcement as undertaken by the Yugoslavian War Crimes
Tribunal.2 9
some say that arresting the indicted Serb principals may shatter Bosnia's fragile
peace. In fact the opposite is true. There can be no reconciliation unless individual
guilt for the appalling crimes of the last few years replaces the pernicious theory of
collective guilt on which so much radical hatred hangs.
Id.
26 Id.

27 See Tadic Appeal, supra note 2, at par. 32, reprintedin 32 I.L.M. 35, 44. Examining
the scope of U.N. Charter Articles 39, 41 and 42, the Appeals Chamber highlighted the
importance of"... the Security Council['s] ... broad discretion in deciding on the course of
action and evaluating the appropriateness of the measures to be taken..." in choosing the
remedy or course of action to implement in the face of a serious threat or breach to international peace. Id.
28 See id. at par. 67, reprintedin 32 I.L.M. at 54. The Appeals Chamber observed that
"International humanitarian law governs the conduct of both internal and international
armed conflicts.. [Blut, contrary to Appellant's contention, the temporal and geographical
scope of both internal and international armed conflicts extends beyond the exact time and
place of hostilities." Id. (citing Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 Aug. 1949, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, 12 Aug. 1949, art. 6 U.S.T. 3316, 5 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention III], respectively); see also Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, 12 Aug. 1949, art. 6, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention IV].
29 There is, in this respect, an evident causal relationship between prosecuting those
who have violated the jus ad bellum (by waging an aggressive war, for instance) and the
needs of international peace and security. However, no apparent relationship obtains between the needs of maintaining a stable world order on the one hand and prosecuting those
who have offended thejus in bello (by attacking civilian objects during actual hostilities, for
example) on the other. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 23, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 170,
172); London Conference, supra note 23, reprinted in 35 I.L.M 223, 223; Framework Agreement, supra note 23, available in 35 I.L.M. 75, 75. It has often been maintained, in this
regard, that regulating or "humanizing" war and preventing it are two mutually exclusive
approaches; that there is an implied contradiction between ameliorating the harsher consequences of armed conflict and striving to prohibit it altogether. Id.; see also BROWNLIE,
supra note 9, at 513. Brownlie's argument proffers a solid philosophical groundwork upon
which the primacy and legitimacy of establishing a court like the Yugoslavian War Crimes
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Tacitly, the Tribunal must be understood as ruling that enforcing international humanitarian law, and thus upholding human
rights in times of war, constitutes an arguably appropriate means
of addressing the needs of international peace and security for the
purposes of Chapter VII. 3° In this respect, although the United
Nations Charter refers broadly to the development of human
rights law as one of its primary purposes, 3 ' it does not entrust this
development to the Security Council, thus limiting the latter's
competence in relieving threats to the peace. 32 The broad relationship between human rights on the one hand, and collective security on the other, however, clearly provides the conceptual framework for Security Council jurisdiction over flagrant violations of
33
basic human rights in armed conflict.
Tribunal to the ends of human rights enforcement may be justified. Id. But see ANDRE
DuRAND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF PEACE IN THE THINKING OF HENRY DuNANT 2829 (Int'l Committee of the Red Cross 1986). Durand develops the Red Cross idea of peace as
a dynamic concept which is informed with three essential elements: (i) protection and respect for human beings as the policy foundation for international law; (ii) the concept of
universal solidarity among men; and (iii) a questioning of the notion that war is inevitable.
Id.
30 Indeed, it must be emphasized at this juncture that the relationship between human
rights and international humanitarian law is arguably the only jurisdictional nexus permitting the U.N. to become involved in the development of humanitarian law at all. Tadic
Appeal, supra note 2, at par. 143, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 35, 73. The Appeals Chamber
clearly lent support to this proposition when it justified the existence of the War Crimes
Tribunal via a Security Council Resolution as one of enforcing international international
humanitarian law. Id. See generally A. van Baarda, The Involvement of the Security Council in Maintaining InternationalPeace and Security, 2 NETH. Q. HuM. RTS. 137, 138-45
(1994).
31 U.N. CHARTER art. 55. See generally supra note 5 and accompanying text.
32 U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51. See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS, REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 30 (1993). The differences between
human rights and humanitarian law have generally been described in the following terms:
[Tihe personal field of application of international humanitarian law is not exactly the
same as that of human rights. To be sure, humanitarian law has seen its field of application considerably enlarged as the effects of warfare have become more numerous.
The civilian population, for example, is today protected under foreign military occupation as well as in the event of enemy attack. But humanitarian law does not protect all
persons on the territory of a belligerent country against excesses committed by the
authorities governing them. In particular, guarantees laid down for persons deprived
of their freedom cover only those imprisoned for acts or reasons "related to the armed
conflict." Even in warfare, therefor, persons imprisoned for penal law offenses are,
generally speaking, protected only by human rights law.
Id. (Footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).
33 See van Baarda, supra note 32, at 143. In this sense, the question of the Security
Council's competence to establish a Tribunal is not unrelated to the subject matter jurisdiction argument which was raised by Tadic. Id. It had been Tadic's contention on appeal that
the criminal provisions of international humanitarian law applicable in the circumstances
related to the corpus of humanitarian principles governing international wars, but did not
reach misconduct occurring in internal armed conflict. Id. As noted below, the Tribunal
answers the question of subject matter jurisdiction by finding that certain rules of custom-
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JURISDICTION TO APPLY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
TO INTERNAL CONFLICTS

The practical force of Tadic's contentions becomes clear when
the subject matter jurisdiction of the Yugoslavian Tribunal is examined.3 4 As Professor Theodor Meron has observed, neither the
Geneva Convention's "grave breaches" provisions (including those
of Protocol I)3 5 nor the Hague Convention 36 extend universal jurisdiction over purely internal wars, although the contrary is true
ary international law apply during internal armed conflict - even in the absence of specific
treaty provisions criminalizing these rules. Id.
However, in so doing, the Tribunal (again) fails to make clear the implications for world
order of bringing international law to bear on crises of a purely internal character. The law
to be applied by the Tribunal clearly embraces situations where a State agency is not necessarily involved (humanitarian law may be applied against the insurgents) and where the
Tribunal's mandate under Chapter VII (to restore peace and security) depends upon its
enforcing human rights and humanitarian norms directly against individual violators not
acting under color of State law. The internal aspect of the Yugoslavian war accentuates the
departure of the law of peace from regulating the relations of States inter sese, and its
corresponding emphasis on protecting groups and individuals even against non-State actors, the traditional province of municipal jurisprudence. Id.
34 See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 554, 555-58 (1995) (criticizing use of Common Article 3 and Protocol II as a basis of
universal jurisdiction); Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, 72
FOREIGN AFF. 122, 127-28 (1993) (discussing application of law to of war crimes); Theodor
Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of InternationalLaw, 88 AM. J.
INT'L L. 78, 83 (1994) (noting prohibitions of Common Article 3 on parties of internal onflicts, are not grave breaches provisions of Geneva Convention).
35 See Geneva Convention I, supra note 28. "Grave breaches" referred to in each of the
Geneva Conventions are defined as acts, committed against other participants in the Conventions, of "willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, biological experiments, [and]
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health." Id.; see also Geneva
Conventions for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea 12 Aug. 1949, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 116
[hereinafter Genvea Convention II] (amelioration of condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked armed forces at sea). Acts against armed forces personnel, wounded or ill in the
field or shipwrecked at sea, that are aimed at the unlawful disabling or taking of property,
which are not justifiable, are also considered grave breaches of the Conventions. Id.; Geneva Convention III, supra note 28, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 238. The deprivation of a fair trial or
compulsion of a prisoner of war to serve on enemy forces also constitute grave breaches. Id.;
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 28, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 388. The unlawful confinement of
civilians and the taking of hostages are punishable offenses. Id.; Protocol Additional I to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (relating to protection of victims of international armed
conflict), Dec. 7, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/32/144/Annex I (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391
(1977) [hereinafter Protocol I] articles 11, 85 (applying to armed conflict which is international in character. Protocol Additional II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflict), Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609, U.N. Doc. A/32/144/Annex II (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Protocol
III, contains no "grave breaches" provisions, but clearly constitutes a restatement of fundamental human rights protected in non-international armed conflict violation of which may
support a finding that a "war crime" has been committed.
36 See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of
Regulations, reprinted in THE LAw OF WAR: A DOcUmENTARY HISTORY 204, 270 (L. Friedman ed., 1972) (setting forth resolutions of second and fourth Hague Conventions in 1899
and 1907, respectively).

19971

DUSKO TADIC

concerning "crimes against humanity" (under the Nuremberg
Charter) 37 and violations of the Genocide Convention. 38 In this respect, neither Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions nor
Protocol II thereto contains a criminal sanctions provision. 39 Despite their application to internal wars, both the Genocide Convention and the Crimes Against Humanity provision of the Nuremberg Charter contain highly restrictive jurisdictional
limitations.4"
Accordingly, in the Tadic Appeal, the Appeals Chamber of the
Yugoslavian War Crimes Tribunal 4 ' was called upon to determine
which violations of customary international law were of such gravity that they should form a basis for criminal jurisdiction under
Article 3 of the Tribunal's statutes.4 2 Finding not all the rules applicable to international wars governed in internal struggles, the
Appeals Chamber nonetheless determined that certain broad
principles of international humanitarian law, which had previ37 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945, art. 6(c), 59 Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 288 (1946) [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. It was the Nuremberg
Charter which first criminalized the waging of an aggressive war. Id.; art 6(a) at 288; see
also Tadic Appeal, supra note 2, at pars. 138-40, reprintedin 32 I.L.M. 35, 72. The court
referenced definition and application of the "crimes against humanity" provision of the Nuremberg Charter and the nexus required with "crimes against peace or war crimes").
38 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12,
1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (defining acts which constitute
genocide and establishing procedure for trial and punishment); see also LAWRENCE J. LEBLANc, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 22-33 (1991) (discussing development of United Nations rule on genocide and conception through drafting of Genocide
Convention); WARREN FREEDMAN, GENOCIDE: A PEOPLE'S WILL TO LIVE 87-95 (1992) (detailing history and analysis of Genocide Convention, as well as current and suggested means of
its implementation).
39 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
40 See Genocide Convention, supra note 38, at arts. I, II. The Genocide Convention contains as a condition to its application, an intent on the part of the violator to destroy an
ethnic, racial or religious group. Id. The offense "crimes against humanity," moreover, has
been given an extremely restrictive interpretation by the Security Council which requires
as an element of the violation that it be committed pursuant to an "official policy of discrimination." Id. See generally FinalReport of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant
to Security CouncilResolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 48' Sess., Annex, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/
1994/674, Paras. 84-86 (1994).
41 See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfillingthe Promise of Filartiga: LitigatingHuman Rights
Claims Against the Estate of FerdinandMarcos, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 65, 104-05 n.156 (1995)
(detailing establishment, jurisdiction, and key points of Yugoslavian War Crimes Tribunal); see also Mark R. von Sternberg, Comparison of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War
Crimes Tribunals: UniversalJurisdiction and the 'Elementary Dictates of Humanity", 22
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 115-19 (1996) (discussing basis of subject matter jurisdiction on
Yugoslavian Tribunal in comparison to that of Rwanda).
42 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuantto Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, art. 3, 3217' mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25704, art. 3,
(1993), available in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993) (vesting power to prosecute international war
crimes in International Tribunal).
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ously applied only to international conflicts, were now relevant to
conflicts of a civil nature by virtue of their relative primacy within
the modern hierarchy of international human rights. 43
In making this determination, the Tribunal looked first to the
provisions of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions which,
as the International Court of Justice had already concluded, codify
the principle of jus cogens." Common Article 3 prescribes: (i) the
obligation to treat humanely those taking no active part in the
hostilities, including combatants who have been removed from
combat; (ii) the prohibition of certain delineated inhumane acts
with respect to the foregoing protected persons; and (iii) the responsibility to care for the sick and wounded.4 5
The prohibitions of Common Article 3 are supplemented by
those of Protocol II, which contain injunctions, in addition to those
contained in Common Article 3, regarding the manner in which
hostilities are conducted. Part IV of Protocol II prohibits: i) direct
43 Although not expressly resolved in its judgement, the determination of the Appeals
Chamber that customary international law could be applied criminally is consistent with a
finding that the principles which the court determined to be governing werejus cogens. For
a full discussion, see infra notes 101-118 and accompanying text. See generally CHRisTos L.
RozAKIs, THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 73 (1976). The author
maintains that the results of the 1969 Vienna Convention suggest a required adherence to
jus cogens norms. Id.
44 See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 4, 105, par. 200, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986) [hereinafter Nicar. v. U.S.]
(discussing effect of customary international law practices within framework of U.N. Charter) see also LAuRi HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NoRms (JUs COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAw
725 (1988) (citing International Court of Justice decision in Barcelona Traction, author
indicates that tribunal enforces view that all states maintain legal interest in protection of
jus cogens norms).
45 See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 28, at art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S 287. Common
Article 3 provides that:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,
without adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or
wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
Id. 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90.
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attacks on the civilian population; 46 ii) making the civilian population the object of acts of terror;47 iii) destruction of objects upon
which the civilian population depends; 48 iv) acts of hostility
against cultural objects or places of worship, 49 and v) the forced
movement of civilians.50
The foregoing summary of provisions illustrates a basic dichotomy in international humanitarian law. Common Article 3 (specifically adopted and supplemented in Articles 4 and 5 of Protocol
II) sets forth a standard of humanity governing the treatment of
those who are under the control of an adverse party to the conflict.
In comparison, Part IV of Protocol II is concerned not with the
treatment of those protected persons who fall under the control of
an adversary, but with prescribing regulations governing the
manner and means by which hostilities are waged. The Hague
Tribunal does not completely adopt the provisions of Protocol II so
as to make these automatically applicable in civil war situations.
The Appeals Chamber, rather, looks to broad principles under the
customary law of war, as that law affects international conflicts, to
determine which of these principles should apply to internal conflicts, by virtue of their normative importance.5 1
The broad principles resolved by the Appeals Chamber include
the following injunctions: (i) fundamental human rights continue
to apply in civil war; (ii) a distinction must be maintained at all
times between civilians and military operations; (iii) civilians
should not be subjected to military attack; (iv) civilian dwellings
and other such installations are not to be subjected to military attack; (v) military operations are not to be conducted against places
used for the protection of civilians (i.e. hospitals, refugee centers,

46 See generally Protocol II, art. 13, supra note 35 (affording general protection to civilian
population until such time as they partake in hostilities).
47 Id. at art. 13(2) (prohibiting "[a]cts or threats of violence [meant to] spread terror
among the civilian population...").
48 Id. at art. 14 (prohibiting starvation of civilians and those acts which may lead to
starvation).
49 Id. at art. 16 (prohibiting hostile acts "directed against historic monuments, works of
art or places of worship... and to use them in support of the military effort").
50 Id. art. 17 (prohibiting ordering or compulsion of civilian displacement in advancement of war).
51 Tadic Appeal, supra note 2, at pars. 52-53, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 35, 49; see also Nicar. v. U.S., at paras. 178, 200 (discussing application of customary international law by
warring nations, where both may interpret and/or apply them differently).
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to "reprisals, forcietc.); and (vi) civilians should not be subjected
52
integrity."
their
on
assaults
or
ble transfers,
These findings conclusively reveal that the reach of customary
international humanitarian law applicable in internal conflicts
contains important principles regulating the ways and means of
combat. The Yugoslavian War Crimes Tribunal in the Tadic Appeal determined that protection of the civilian population from
military attack has virtually achieved status as a rule of jus
cogens so that violations of this principle give rise to universal jurisdiction. 53 The sections that follow illustrate the growing interrelationship between general regulation of the conduct of hostilities, the right to life in international law, and the new dynamic
concept of peace - a configuration of customary norms which this
essay has characterized as the new humanitarian order.

52 Id. at Para. III (citing G.A. Res. 2675, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970)). Prior to the ruling in the Tadic Appeal, the degree to which customary
international law governed civil conflicts remained unclear. Where international wars were
involved, however, customary law clearly mandated that civilians be protected against the
effects of hostilities. See, e.g., Claude Pilloud, Jean de Preux, Yves Sandoz, Bruno Zimmermann, Philippe Eberlin, Hans Peter Gasser, Claude F. Wengel, Commentary on the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of the Victims of InternationalArmed Conflicts (ProtocolI), in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 593
(Y. Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter Commentary to Protocol I]. The decision in the
TadicAppeal makes the principle of civilian protection applicable, as a matter of customary
law, to internal wars. See also S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453 mtg. at 1, U.N.
Doc. S./RES/955 (1994), the statute of the criminal tribunal established for violations of
international humanitarian law deemed to have taken place in Rwanda. The latter resolution reposes jurisdiction in the tribunal for specified violations of common article 3 and
Protocol II. Id. art. 4.
53 This summary of the Tadic Appeal's holding is based on a prior article by the author.
See Mark R. von Sternberg, The Plight of the Non-Combatant in Civil War and the New
Criteriafor Refugee Status, 9 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 170, 185-86 (1997). The Tadic Appeal is
the first instance of an international tribunal holding that customary rules codified by the
Geneva Conventions and by Protocol II governing internal conflicts can give rise to universal jurisdiction. Id. Although the Tribunal does not specifically say so, its ruling can only be
explained by the rationale that the mandatory distinction between civilians and military
operations really constitutes jus cogens and serves as the basis for criminal responsibility.
Id. See generally Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66
TEx. L. REV. 785, 838 (1988):
While the universality principle may be funcitionally distinguishable from the jus
cogens or erga omnes doctrines, the customary law condemnation of these human
rights offenses and that subjection of these offenses to the erga omnes and jus cogens
doctrines may logically support the expansion of universal jurisdiction over these additional offenses ["murder and causing disappearances of individuals" and "prolonged
arbitrary detention"].
Id. (emphasis in original).
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III.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

NORMS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY

The Appeals Chamber began its analysis of the scope of customary law applicable in internal armed conflict with an abbreviated

history of the development of human rights and humanitarian law
since the period immediately preceding the outbreak of World
War II. The Tribunal notes that international law has treated interstate wars and civil wars in distinctly different ways. While
interstate wars were regulated by a developed body of rules, internal conflicts remained governed primarily by the State's domestic
laws. This early position on humanitarian jurisprudence was attributed to the prevailing view that State sovereignty was the essential feature of the international system. International law was
properly invoked only when States interacted, not when they
sought to deal with internal upheaval.54
Beginning in the 1930's, however, international rules began to
be applied in civil wars. In general, this development was explained by the proliferation of internal wars caused by technological advances and access to weapons. The tendency of internal violence to draw in third States who exercised some political,
economic or ideological interest in the conflict became increasingly
common. Finally, in a dramatic transformation of international
law, the rise of a human rights doctrine, and in particular, the
1948 UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, fostered a markedly

different approach to problem solving in the international
community:
A State sovereignty approach has been gradually supplanted
by a human-being oriented approach. Gradually the maxim
of Roman law hominum causa omne jus constitutum est (all
law is created for the benefit of human beings) has gained a
foothold in the international community as well. It follows
that in the area of armed conflict the distinction between interstate wars and civil wars is losing its value as far as

human beings are concerned. Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as
well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering
when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet re54

See Tadic Appeal, supra note 2, at par. 53, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 35, 49.
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frain from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when armed violence has erupted "only" within the
territory of a sovereign State? If international law, while of
course safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must
gradually turn to the protection of human beings, it is only
natural that the aforementioned dichotomy should gradually
lose its weight.5 5
The analysis offered by the Appeals Tribunal parallels developments in international law growing out of the establishment of the
United Nations Charter. The advent of the Charter heralded a
new theory with respect to the relationship between sovereign
states and the maintenance of international peace and security.
The Charter's predecessor, the League of Nations, stressed procedures for the pacific resolution of international disputes. Most notably mandatory arbitration, judicial settlement and measures for
collective security in the event of a breach, were found to be appropriate vehicles for maintaining the peace.5 6
The United Nations Charter, however, adopted an entirely different approach. 7 The focus shifted from methods of the relief of
interstitial strife to addressing the "underlying causes" of human
rights violations which had in fact precipitated the outbreak of
world conflict."8 The Charter's preamble reaffirms the commit55 Id. at par. 54.
56 See Mark R. von Sternberg, PerHumanitatem ad Pacem: InternationalHumanitarian
Norms as a Jurisprudenceof Peace in the Former Yugoslavia, 3 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 357, 374-84 (1995). The author further details the principles of humanitarian law, its
enforcement and regulation. Id.; see also MARGARET E. BURTON, THE ASSEMBLY OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS 284 (1941). See generally LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT arts. 12-17.

Here guidelines were established by which League Members must conduct themselves as
between fellow Members and non-Members. Id.
57 U.N. CHARTER Preamble. The preamble of the United Nations Charter provides, inter
alia,that the People of the United Nations undertake to adopt the Charter since they are
determined:
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has
brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women
and of nations large and small...
Id.; see also U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55 and 56. These articles uphold the role of human
rights in connection with the purposes of the organization.
58 See I.F. Stone, The Rights of Gorbachev, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 16, 1989, at 3. This
commentator has summarized this evolution in the following way:
This was the chief difference between the Charter of the United Nations and the Covenant of the League of Nations which preceded it. The Covenant emphasized disarmament - not just that equivocal phrase 'arms control'.., and the powerful resolution of
disputes between nations to prevent another war. The Charter struck a new note. For
the first time it added human rights to the international vocabulary. It sought to transcend national boundaries and mentalities, emphasizing the protection of human
rights within nations, whether the rights of majorities or individuals. The change re-
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ment of the "Peoples of the United Nations" to fundamental
human rights and treats these rights as related to collective concern regarding the "scourge of war." These considerations are further made the subject of dispositive findings. In the Universal
Declarationof Human Rights, the horrors of human rights violations in this century alone were denounced and a new world order
recognizing human rights was aspired to. 5 9
The United Nations Secretary-General, in his first report on
"Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict," recognized the relationship between protecting international human rights, world
peace and security: "The Second World War gave conclusive proof
of the close relationship between outrageous behavior of a Government towards its own citizens and aggression towards other nations, thus between respect for human rights and the maintenance of the peace."60
Article 89 of Protocol I draws a clear and compelling nexus between human rights and humanitarian law. This article establishes that, in the event of "serious violations" of the Geneva Conventions or of Protocol I, the parties agree to act in cooperation
with the United Nations. 6 ' The term "serious violations" was generally considered to include "grave breaches" (although the scope
of the provision is not so limited),62 and the United Nations action
flected the lessons of the Second World War, which demonstrated that internal regimes
were not just a domestic matter but could themselves be a menace to world peace.
Id.
59 See The Universal Declarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/
800 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declarationof Human Rights]. This document provides

that:
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts
which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want
has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.
Id.
60 Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict, supra note 8, at para. 16.
61 See Protocol I, supra note 35, art. 89; see also Henry G. Schremers, The Obligation to
Intervene in the Domestic Affairs of States, in HUMANITARIAN LAw OF ARMED CONFLICT:

AHEAD 590-92 (Astrid J.M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991) (describing
United Nations as integral part of peacekeeping operations).
CHALLENGES
62

See Commentary to Protocol I, supra note 52, at 1035; see also JUDITH GAIL GARDAM,
IMMUNITY AS A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 110-11

NON-COMBATANT

(1993) (discussing scope of Protocol I in relation to wars of self-determination). See generally Christine Van Den Wyngaert, The Suppression of War Crimes UnderAdditional Protocol I, in HUMNITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT CHALLENGES AHEAD,supra note 61, at 198

(discussing how Protocol I has considerably expanded category of crimes now considered to
be "grave breaches").
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contemplated included the use of force. 6 3 The Commentary to Protocol I makes it clear that the wording of Article 89 is modelled
after that of Article 56 of the United Nations Charter, which focuses on "cooperation for the achievement of universal respect for
all with a view to ensuring peaceful and friendly relations among
nations."6 4 Article 89 attempts to achieve the same result with respect to human rights in armed conflict: "Acting for the protection
of man, also in time of armed conflict, accords with the aims of the
United Nations no less than
does the maintenance of interna65
tional peace and security."
The relationship between human rights and the law of armed
conflict has been the subject of extensive commentary by treatise
writers.6 On occasion, commentators have recommended a fusion
of these two bodies of law into a new jurisprudence to be named
Human Law.6 7 There has been general agreement, however, that
the rights secured by international humanitarian law require
more detailed protection than human rights in general,6 8 the for63 See Commentary to Protocol I, supra note 52, at 1035; see also THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAw m ARMED CONFLICTS 517-550 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995) (detailing enforcement of international humanitarian law).
64 Commentary to Protocol I, supra note 52, at 1033. See generally George H. Aldrich,
Why the United States of America Should Ratify Additional Protocol I, in HUMANITARIAN
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT. CHALLENGES AHEAD,supra note 61, at 130 (stressing importance
of Protocol I to humanitarian law).
65 Commentary to ProtocolI, supra note 52, at 1034. See U.N. CHARTER art. 56. Article 56
of the United Nations Charter provides as follows:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on the principle for equal
rights and self-determination of peoples the United Nations shall promote:
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
Id.; see also Richard T. Baxter, The Duties of Combatants and the Conduct of Hostilities, in
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HuMANITARIAN LAw 99-100 (1988).

The author notes the

compatibility of the mutual goals of Protocol I and the U.N. Charter. Id.
66 See HuMA rrL
LAw OF ARMED CONFLICT. CHALLENGES AHEAD (Astrid J.M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991) (collection of essays by experts in field of humanitarian
law); see also NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HuMANITARIAN LAw (Michael

Bothe et al. eds., 1990) (same).
67 See, e.g., JEAN PIC'rET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITA-

RiAN LAw 63-68 (1985) (discussing common principles of humanitarian law, including invio-

lability, nondiscrimination and security); see also Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., The Grotian
Vision of World Order, 76 Am.J. INTrL L. 477, 496 (1982) (reminding that human law is
closely related to natural law, which is established by customs of nearly all nations and
whose common usage creates general obligation of compliance).
68 See Liz Philipose, The Laws of War and Women's Human Rights, HYPATIA, Sept. 1,
1996, at 46, available in 1996 WL 13340521 (discussing applicability of humanitarian law
to discrete, extreme and unique circumstances of armed conflict, as compared to human
rights law, which is applicable to everyday circumstances).
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mer are designed to preserve such fundamental interests as the
right to life within a climate of social violence. 6 9
IV. THE

PRIMACY OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE RED CROSS IDEA OF PEACE

Essential among the human rights which humanitarian law
seeks to preserve is the right to life. 7 0 This right is referred to extensively in international human rights instruments. 7 1 Furthermore, the right to life is given paramount concern in seminal documents since the exercise of all remaining human rights
necessarily depends on one's right to life being respected.7 2
Both Common Article 3 and Protocol II afford detailed protection to this broad right.7 3 As one commentator phrased it: "A more
specific definition [than the one given in international human
rights instruments] is needed, since the killing of enemy personnel is considered to be a legitimate act."74 Hence, the background
of lawful hostilities in which the right to life is being asserted re69 See SCHINDLER, supra note 8, at 9-10; see also HANS HAUG, HuMANrTY FOR ALL 611-27

(1993). See generally Hernan Salinas Burgos, The Application of InternationalHumanitarian Law as Compared to Human Rights Law in Situations Qualified as Internal Armed
Conflict, Internal Disturbancesand Tension, or PublicEmergency, with Special Reference to
War Crimes and Political Crimes, in IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAw 1-27 (Fritz Kalshoven & Yves Sandoz eds., 1989) (discussing need for human right
guarantees for victims of armed conflict; guarantees which must be specific to their condition as victims of such conflicts).
70 The discussion which follows is not intended to provide an exhaustive review of the
relationship between international humanitarian law and the law of human rights. Rather,
it is intended to focus broadly on the right to life. For further information, see THEODOR
MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 23 (1987).

The author describes the right to life as being non-derogable, stressing the importance of
its protection during armed conflict. Id.
71 See Universal Declarationof Human Rights, supra note 59, at art. 3. "Everyone has
the right to life, liberty and security of the person." Id.; see also InternationalCovenant on
Civil and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), art. 6(1). "Every
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." Id. See generally Parker & Neylon, supra note 12,
at 431 (1989). The right to life has a prominent position in virtually every major international human rights instrument. Id.
72 See David J. Scheffer, InternationalJudicial Intervention, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar. 1,
1996, at 34, available in 1996 WL 10201027. Initially, there is a need to overcome years of
human rights abuse in order for society to move forward. Id. With respect to the primacy of
the right to life vis-&-vis other human rights, see generally B.G. RAMcHARAN, THE RIGHT TO
LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1985).
73 See generally Charles Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol II and its Relation to Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other Human Rights Instruments, 33 Am.
U. L. REv. 9 (1983).
74 SCHINDLER, supra note 8, at 10. See John Embry Parkerson, Jr., United States Compliance with HumanitarianLaw: Respecting Civilians During Operation Just Cause, 133
MIL. L. REV. 31, 89 (1991) (noting difficulty in distinguishing between death resulting from
lawful armed conflict and death arbitrarily caused as retribution).
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quires that the mechanisms for protecting that right be set forth
in detail.7 5
Common Article 3 contains, in its initial clause, a bar against
"violence to life and person, including murder of all kinds."7" Article 4 of Protocol II prohibits violence to life and physical well-being
including murder, mutilation, collective punishments and the taking of hostages.7" Article 5 of Protocol II mandates a minimum
standard of humanity for those under the control of an adverse
party to the conflict: They shall be provided with adequate food
and drink as well as safeguards with respect to their health; they
shall also be allowed to receive individual and collective relief.7,
The integration of humanitarian law and human rights principles serve to creatively define peace as a process occurring among
States and peoples, and founded on respect for freedom and equality of human rights.7 9 In this way, the conventional and "negative"
75 See von Sternberg, supra note 56, at 377-78 (detailing means of protecting fundamental right to life during lawful hostilities). See generally David Weissbrodt & Beth Andrus,
The Right to Life During Armed Conflict: Disabled Persons' v. United States, 29 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 59, 69-78 (1988) (interpreting fundamental right to life during armed conflict as
being in accord with customary international law).
76 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 28, art. 3; see also Glenn P. Orgeron, The Responsibility for Training Foreign Military Personnel: Should Arms Transfers be Conditions as
Training in the Law of Armed Conflict?, 78 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 1, 8-9 (1984)(discussing right to life as it is protected by Common Article 3). But see Parkerson, supra note 74, at
89 (noting that Common Article 3 does not expressly guarantee "right to life").
77 Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 4(2). See G.I.A.D. Draper, The Development of International HumanitarianLaw, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAw 84 (1988)

(crediting Protocol II for protecting the human rights of those whose liberties are restricted
by an armed conflict); see also Richard N. Kiwanuka, HumanitarianNorms and Internal
Strife, in IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 246-47 (Fritz Kalshoven

& Yves Sandoz eds., 1989) (discussing Protocol II's aim of developing and augmenting Article 3). See generally Dennis J. Mitchell, All is Not Fairin War: The Need for a Permanent

War Crimes Tribunal, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 575, 591 (1996) (discussing high threshold needed
before Article 4 of Protocol II can be invoked to enforce its guarantee of humane treatment
for civilians).
78 Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 5(l)(b); see also Anwar T. Frangi, The Internalized
NoninternationalArmed Conflict in Lebonan, 1975-1980: Introduction to Confligology, 22
CAP. U. L. REV. 965, 1014 (1993) (calling Article 5 of Protocol II "declarative of the customary rules of armed conflict"). But see Laura Lopez, Uncivil Wars: The Challenge ofApplying
InternationalHumanitarianLaw to InternalArmed Conflicts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 916, 935

(1994) (noting Article 5 contains nothing to prevent arbitrary detention of innocent
civilians).
79

See, e.g., World Red Cross Conference on Peace,Program of Action of the Red Cross as

a Factor of Peace (1975) in INTERNATIONAL

COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS AND INTERNA-

TIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENTS 646, 647 (13th ed. 1994). The preamble notes that:
The Red Cross does not view peace simply as the absence of war, but rather as a dynamic process of cooperation among all States and peoples; cooperation founded on
freedom, independence, national sovereignty, equality, respect of human rights, as
well as a fair and equitable distribution of resources to meet the needs of peoples.
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definition of peace, which characterizes peace as an absence of
war, has been superseded by the new and dynamic definition embraced by the Red Cross:8 0
[TIhe Red Cross has increasingly turned toward this positive
concept of peace ....
[Tihis concept of peace emerges out of
modern international law, which is not limited in the traditional sense, but - as an international law of cooperation increasingly brings about economic and social development,
"better standards of life in larger freedom" (preamble to the
UN Charter) and finally Human Rights for All."'
Regulating the manner in which hostilities are conducted promotes the right to life in international law while operating as an
essential medium for redressing threats to the peace through
human rights observance. 2 There is, in this sense, a compelling
relationship between the broad humanitarian policies underlying
the customary law of war (as determined by the Appeals' Chamber
to apply in internal conflict by virtue of their fundamental character)8 3 and the needs to be served by the emerging and dynamic
concept of peace.
Jean Pictet has outlined these essential policies in his seminal
work, Development and Principles of InternationalHumanitarian
Law.8 4 A core principle is that the civilian population must be proId.
80 Id. See Theodor Meron, The ContinuingRole of Custom in the Foundationof International HumanitarianLaw, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238, 239-40 (1996). Humanitarian principles
were studied and utilized to formulate legal standards for the Hague Tribunal, which is
currently adjudicating the war crimes that occurred in the former Yugoslavia. Id.
HAUG, supra note 69, at 586. See generally STUDIES AND ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL HuMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET (Christopher
Swinarski ed., 1984) (compiling collection written in four languages as part of quest for
universal application of humanitarian law).
81 HAUG, supra note 69, at 586 [emphasis in original]. See Burrus M. Carnahan, Unnecessary Suffering, The Red Cross and Tactical Laser Weapons, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 705, 706 (1996) (discussing Red Cross' unique status in public international law).
82 See Matthew I. Kupferberg, Balkan War Crimes Trials:Forum Selection, 17 B.C. INT'L
& CoMp. L. REV. 375, 383 (1994) (stating that London International Assembly Commissions recommended broad application of laws regulating armed conflict in order to encompass human rights).
83 Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N.SCOR, 48' Sess., Annex, art. 3, 3217' mtg., U.N. Doc.S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159.
84 PICTET, supra note 67, at 71-78 (discussing how principles "proper to law of war"
should serve to confine activities strictly to military objectives, prevent danger to non-combatants and eliminate undue suffering); see also Florentino P. Feliciano, Marine Pollution
and Spoilation of NaturalResources as War Measures: A Note on Some InternationalLaw
Problems in the Gulf War, 14 Hous. J. INT'L L. 483, 513-14 (1992) (dicussing Pictet's principles of limitation).
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tected from the dangers of military operations."5 To that end, it is
incumbent upon parties to the conflict to differentiate between the
civilian populace and the combatants. The former must never be
the object of attack or reprisals.8 6 Acts intended to spread terror
through the civilian population are forbidden."7 Affirmative precautions are required to spare the civilian population or, at least,
to minimize its injuries."8 Property essential to the survival of the
population cannot be destroyed. 9 Indiscriminate attacks are pro85 See PICTET, supra note 67, at 72. The author outlines six procedures that should be
adhered to in order to ensure the protection of civilians during military conflicts. Id.; see,
e.g., Sylvie-Stoyanka Junod, Commentaryon the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, in COMMENTARY ON THE PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, supra note 52, at 1443 [hereinafter Commentary to Protocol
I!]. The author notes that:
The principle of immunity of those who do not participate directly in hostilities has in
fact been recognized for a long time, in situations of both national and international
armed conflict. Thus, in 1863, the Lieber Code [prepared for the Union Army in the
American civil war] already provided that "an unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property and honor, as much as the exigencies of war will permit."
Id.
86 See Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 13(2); see also Commentary to Protocol II, supra
note 85, at 1459. It is observed that:
Further, it is not admissible that one of the parties could destroy or render useless
objects indispensable to the civilian population living in the part of the territory under
its control because it suspected that the latter supported or sympathized with the adversary. It should be recalled that collective punishments and pillage are prohibited
by the Protocol.
Id.
87 Id.; Alicia H. Petrarca, An Impetus of Human Wreckage? The 1996 Amended
Landmark Protocol, 27 CAL. W. IN'L L.J. 205, 222 (1996). The Protocol removes any ambiguity surrounding the definition of "civilian": In case of doubt, the presumption must be
made that the person in question is a civilian. Id. The distinction between civilians and
combatants is extremely important because it ultimately determines who may legally kill
and be killed. Id. See generally Glick, supra note 10, at 75. Those who suffer as a consequence of armed conflict must be protected.
See Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 13(2); see also Chris Jochnick & Roger Normand, The
Legitimization of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARv. INr'L L.J. 49,
79-83 (1994) (discussing historical use of the laws of armed conflict, which were invariably
invoked to justify terrorist attacks against civilians). But see Frits Kalshoven, "Guerrilla"
and "Terrorism"in Internal Armed Conflict, 33 Am. U.L. REv. 67, 78 (1983) (noting that
attacks during war cannot refrain from spread terror among civilians).
88 Commentary to Protocol II, supra note 85, at 1449. It was observed that:
The implementation of such practices requires that precautions are taken both by the
party launching the attack during the planning, decision and action stages of the attack, and by the party that is attacked. For example, military installations should not
be intentionally placed the midst of a concentration of civilians with a view to using the
latter as a shield for the purposes of making the adverse party abandon an attack,
without forgetting any other safety measures which are explicitly laid down in Protocol
II.
Id.
89 Id. See generally Major Vaughn A. Ary, Concluding Hostilities: HumanitarianProvisions in Cease-FireAgreements, 148 MIL. L. REv. 186, 204-208 (1995). A description of the
procedures used to care for the civilian population in a war zone is found therein. Id.
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hibited, as are attacks which are likely to cause excessive loss and
injury to civilians and their property in light of the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated. 90 The starvation of civilians
is prohibited. 9
Under accepted principles of customary international humanitarian law, civilians are exempted from the harsher realities of
war by limitations on the ways and means of combat. These limitations seek to minimize the injury which could otherwise flow to
either civilians or their property through austere application of
prophylactic measures, including the rule of proportionality. Of
critical moment in this regard is Article 15 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention which provides for the establishment of "neutral
92
zones" to safeguard civilians from the effects of combat.
In 1993, the Security Council drew on the concept of these
"safety zones" under international humanitarian law to establish
"safe areas" with respect to certain Bosnian cities for those not
Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 14. But see Stephanie N. Simonds, Conventional Warfare
and Environmental Protection: A Proposal for International Legal Reform, 29 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 165, 181 (1992) (noting exception to Article 54 of Protocol I if destruction is required by military necessity).
90 See Commentary to Protocol II, supra note 85, at 1450. The idea that the proportionality rule applies in internal armed conflict by virtue of Common Article 3 (as supplemented
by Protocol II) is itself supported by the Commentary to Protocol II:
It is appropriate to recall here the most important of these principles, i.e., the principle
to use the minimum force required to harm the enemy, the principle of distinction and
the principle of proportionality which only intervene when it is not possible to ensure
the total immunity of the population:
- parties engaged in a conflict do not have the unlimited right as regards the means
injuring the enemy;
- a distinction should be made at all times between persons participating in hostilities and the civilian population, so that the latter may be spared as far as possible;
- the relation between the direct military advantage anticipated from an attack and
the harmful effects which could result on the persons and objects protected should be
considered in advance.
Id. But see Edward Kwakwa, BelligerentReprisals in the Law of Armed Conflict, 27 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 49, 59-60 (1990). The author expresses his doubt that any prohibition of reprisal
against civilians will ever be adhered to or effective. Id.
91 See Protocol I, supra note 35, art. 54; see also Charles A. Allen, Civilian Starvation
and Relief During Armed Conflict: The Modern HumanitarianLaw, 19 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 4-8 (1989) (discussing historical use of starvation, which was frequently employed as military tactic).
92 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 28, art. 15. This article states that:
Any party to the conflict may, either directly or through a neutral State or some humanitarian organization, propose to the adverse Party to establish, in the regions
where the fighting is taking place, neutralized zones intended to shelter from the effects of war the following persons without distinction:
(a) wounded and sick combatants or non-combatants.
(b) civilian persons who take no part in the hostilities, and who, while they reside in
the zones, perform no work of a military character.
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involved in the conflict. 93 This step quite clearly constitutes a fusion of fundamental principles relating to the protection of noncombatants emanating from the law of war and the Security
Council's essential function under the Charter to relieve threats to
the peace. Such "safety zones" create "oases of humanity in war"
which may serve as "seed beds" for the "coming peace."94
Humanitarian law thus exempts large classes from the scourge
of war through a device which it characterizes as a "safety zone."95
96
These "zones of peace" (as they have sometimes been referred to)
are actually geographic localities wherein, by agreement of the
belligerents, protected classes are sheltered from the ravaging effects of hostilities. These territorial enclaves are at once a practical containment of the conflicts' violence, as well as symbolic of the
Red Cross' humane principle, sparing those taking no active part
in hostilities. By proliferating its "zones of peace" and thus ex93 Id. See Protocol I, supra note 35, art. 50 (establishing rules for non-combat zones); von
Sternberg, supra note 56, at 383 (noting creation of zones of peace was mechanism for
protecting those outside conflict, showing that Geneva Convention expresses concerns beyond combatants). See generally L. Lynn Hogue, Identifying Customary InternationalLaw
of War in Protocol I: A Proposed Restatement, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 279, 301
(1990) (reviewing what can and cannot be done with demilitarized zones).
See S.C.Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 48' Sess., 3208th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (1993).
The Resolution declares that:
The capital city of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, and other such
threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Guradze, Bihac, as well as
Srebrenica, and their surrounding areas should be treated as safe areas by all the
parties concerned and should be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile
acts.
Id. The "safe areas," although not expressly established under Article 15 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, clearly reflect the Security Council's analogizing from principles of international humanitarian law to create the practical equivalent of "Red Cross Zones." Id.;
see also S.C.Res. 819, U.N.SCOR, 48' Sess., 3199th mtg., S/RES/819 (1993)(demanding that
Srebrenica become safe area free from military attack); John E. Fink, From Peacekeeping to
Peace Enforcement: The Blurringof the Mandate for the Use of Force in MaintainingInternationalPeace and Security, 19 MD. J. INT'L & TRADE 1, 29 (1995) (explaining that Resolution 819 was needed to procure humanitarian assistance in face of highly unsettled
conditions).
94 See HAUG, supra note 69, at 588.
95 See COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CILIAN
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 120, 129 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958); see also Report of the Secretary-

General Pursuantto Security Council Resolution 836, U.N. Doc. S/25939 at 1-2 (1993)(noting one of main goals of safe haven operations was to protect civilians from military attack); Sean D. Murphy, The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective
Security After the Cold War, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 201, 212 (1994) (observing that
many acts on part of United Nations Security Council are designed to protect civilians from
armed attack). See generally Marian Nash (Leich), War Powers Resolution, 88 AM. J. INT'L
L. 522, 523 (1994) (stating that among other places, Sarajevo was specifically classified as
"no fly zone" because of numerous civilian attacks).
96 For a discussion identifying the "safety zones" with the broader concept of "zones of
peace," see von Sternberg, supra note 56, at 392-93 and authorities cited therein.
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panding the protections available to select classes and groups, humanitarian law seeks to advance the peace process in a very real
sense.
A necessary complement to the "zones of peace," however, is the
dissemination of humanitarian ideals. As noted in the Commentary to Protocol I, in keeping with thejus ad bellum principle, incidental to promoting peace, humanitarian law also limits the "effects of [wartime] hostilities."9 7
It is the didactic aspect of international humanitarian law
which most strongly urges its forceful application as an indispensable element of the ongoing peace process governed by the Dayton Accords. 98 The group animosities which have been festering by
the specter of unpunished atrocities must be redressed on an individual basis to avoid collective retribution. Palpable violations of
international humanitarian law have helped to fuel the cycle of
violence and passions which originally provoked the war. Ignoring these violations contributes to the public view that the offended law is without social importance and that the violative behavior can continue.
Failing to redress this sense of public injustice proliferated by
criminal misconduct will ultimately create a peace structured on
vulnerable foundations. At the very least, the norms which are
advanced in the war crimes process, the humanitarian ideal of
peace through human rights observance, must be vindicated if the
Dayton settlement is to endure. 99 Any resolution of the Bosnian
97 Commentary to Protocol I, supra note 52, at 26. The Commentary states:
A moral and humanitarian argument can be added to this legal aspect [i.e., the principle thatjus ad bellum may be permissible in certain instances]: Just as the dissemination of humanitarian law contributes to the promotion of humanitarian ideals and a
spirit of world peace among nations, the faithful application of such law can contribute
to reestablishing peace, by limiting the effects of hostilities.
Id.
98 See Richard Falk, Essay, The Complexities of Humanitarian Intervention: A New
World Order Challenge, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 491, 508 (1996) (pointing out that negotiations
were held with accused war criminals); Sharon Healey, ProsecutingRape Under the Statute
of the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 327, 377-78
(1995) (observing difficulties maintaining credibility of tribunal to prosecute war crimes
when negotiation settlements were taking place almost simultaneously). See generally
TJAGSA Practice Notes, International and Operational Law Notes, InternationalCriminal
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia Update, 1996-Mar. ARMY LAw. 128, 128 (1996) (noting
difficulty of negotiating with numerous officials accused of war crimes).
99 See James Podgers, The World Cries for Justice, 82 Apr. A.B.A. J. 52, 52 (1996) (recognizing that Tribunal to prosecute war criminals is most important factor in whether Dayton Accords will hold). But see Anthony D'Amato, Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AM.
J. INT'L L. 500, 500 (1994) (contending that providing amnesty for war criminals in Bosnian
conflict might end hostilities sooner and save more lives).
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crisis must adopt a commitment to the view that respect for
human rights constitutes an organizing principle of society and
that lasting international tranquility depends upon its enforcement. It is the nexus of peace and human rights which constitutes
the distinguishing feature of the new humanitarian order. 0 0
V. THE

RISE OF JUS COGENS AND THE MONISTIC

INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Tadic court found that the defendant had committed "serious" violations of customary law. It also found support for the notion that such violations should give rise to universal jurisdiction,
both in the practice of States and in select resolutions adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly. The court thus found a
practical convergence between State and "international"
practice. 1 ° 1
While the Appeals Chamber's approach follows accepted lines of
analysis, it neglects to explicitly address the theory which would
have been the most appropriate in light of the "human-being" approach to international law which the Tribunal adopted. In summary form, the theory concerns the violations of Common Article 3
and of fundamental principles expressed in Protocol II, which together foster the rise of universal jurisdiction on the ground that
the foregoing instruments codify jus cogens norms.
Jus cogens (or peremptory norms) pertain to those principles
which have risen to the apex of the international human rights
100 See Michel Veuthey, Vers une Politique Humanitaire,in STUDIES

AND ESSAYS ON IN989, 1004 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984); see also An Agenda for Peace-PreventiveDiplomacy, Peacemaking and PeaceKeeping: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. SCOR 47h Sess., Agenda Item 10, § 17, U.N.
Doc. S/24111 (1992). The Secretary-General has outlined a plan in which he approaches
preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-building and the role human
rights must play in this process. Id.; Judy Gallant, HumanitarianIntervention and Security Council Resolution 688: A Reappraisalin Light of a Changing World Order,7 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 881, 904-05 (1992). Human rights violations could affect ongoing efforts for
peace in the region, due largely to the globalization of human rights norms. Id.; Diego Garcia-Sayan, Human Rights and Peace-Keeping Operations, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 41, 43 (1994).
An outline to the Secretary-General's approach is supplied therein. Id.
101 See Nicaraguav. U.S., at 98-108. The court relied on United Nations Resolutions for
its normative content in support of finding violations of customary law. Id. See generally
Victor Mayer-Schonberger & Teree E. Foster, More Speech, Less Noise: Amplifying ContentBased Speech Regulation Through Binding InternationalLaw, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 59, 95 (1995). Members of the United Nations have bound themselves to the international norms embodied within its Charter. Id.; Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity
in InternationalLaw, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 416 (1983). Classifying a resolution as a norm
or merely a document with legal significance is still debated. Id.
TERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN HONOR OF JEAN PICTET
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hierarchy.'" 2 Accordingly, such norms cannot be deemed merely
customary in the accepted sense. Rather, these norms have
achieved a status of such importance in the international community that State action deemed inconsistent with such norms will
be declared void. As set forth in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties: "A peremptory norm of general international law
is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent10 3norm of general international law having the same character."

In this way, jus cogens is binding not only on State action, but
also on international arrangements which are inconsistent with
applicable peremptory norms. This result flows from the very centrality and indispensability of the norms themselves. If the international order can only be held together by universal respect for
the bar against genocide, for instance, the proclivity of a State to
violate the norm or to countenance violation of it must be preempted as a matter of international public policy.
It is now a widely accepted doctrine with respect to international criminal jurisdiction that the norms on which that jurisdiction is based can be either conventional or customary. Violations
of fundamental human rights included within the category of jus
cogens may be made the subject of universal jurisdiction on the
premise that States have an obligation erga omnes to bring the
violators to justice. As one writer concluded: "One might argue
that 'when committed by individuals,' violations of erga omnes obligations and peremptory norms 'may be punishable by any State
under the universality principle'."10

4

In such instances, universal

102 See, e.g., Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchyof InternationalHuman Rights, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (1986). "Fundamental human rights" have risen to a distinction of a peremptory norm, distinguishing it from other commonly thought of rights. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 cmt.k (1987). Peremptory norms
are ones permitting no derogation. Id. See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Third State Remedies in InternationalLaw, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 57, 65 (1989). Much international human
rights law would be unenforceable without the status ofjus cogens. Id.
103 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1968, art. 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
347 (in force Jan. 27, 1980). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§ 102 cmt.k (1987).
104 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 cmt.k (1987)
(quoting OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 264 (1979)).
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jurisdiction may be grounded in customary international law on
the premise that the violator remains hostis humani generis. °5
The scope of protection under that customary law, as noted in
the Commentary to Common Article 3, quite clearly extends to all
those who are not participants in combat, irrespective of nationality, race, religion or other affiliation of the victim. The status as
jus cogens of Common Article 3's requirement
to treat these pro10 6
tected persons humanely is indisputable.
Article 3 norms have been declared by the International Court
of Justice to bejus cogens and to constitute "elementary considerations of humanity."10 7 The comparative primacy of Common Article 3 principles within the international order can be appreciated
from the description given in the Commentary to the Geneva Convention. There, Common Article 3 principles are described as demanding respect for rules already recognized as essential to civilized existence long before the Conventions were signed.' 0 8
105 See United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1884) (finding
pirate is enemy of all mankind); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197
(1820) (finding robbery on high seas within criminal jurisdiction of all nations); United
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820) (holding pirate is accountable under
international law as enemy of all mankind); see also Randall, supra note 53, at 830 (contending that since violators ofjus cogens norms affect all states, they therefore should be
prosecuted whether or not states are involved). See generally 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 68 (U. Chi. ed. 1979) (explaining that hostis humani
generis act is without any pretense of state authority and offend all nations); Jordan J.
Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARv. Hum.
RTS. J. 51, 59 (1992) (acknowledging private actor responsibility under customary international law).
106 See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS As CUSTOMARY LAw

34 (1989). "Article 3(1)(a)-(c) are of such fundamental character and "echo so many provisions in other humanitarian and human rights treaties, that they must be regarded as
embodying minimum standards of customary law..." Id. Common Article 3 (1)(a)-(c) prohibits violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture taking of hostages and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment with respect to persons taking no active part in the
conflict. Id. Nicar.v. United States, 1986 I.C.J 4, 105, para. 105, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023
(1996). Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention was utilized for itsjus cogens status in
this case. Id.; Parker & Neylon, supra note 12, at 434. The I.C.J. recognized Common Article 3 as a peremptory norm. Id. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Recent Development, Applicability of International CriminalLaws to Events in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 499, 505-06 (1994). Many Geneva provisions including Common Article 3
are reflective of jus cogens norms. Id.
107 See Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 105.
108 See COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION
OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 50 (Pictet ed. 1952). To illustrate
the universality of the principles under discussion, the Commentary indicates that the
rules would apply even outside the scope of internal armed conflict, i.e., to civil disturbances which could be described as acts of banditry. Id.; see also I.C.R.C. COMMENTARY ON
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE

1977

TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF

12

AUGUST

1949 1340 (1987). Article 3 embodies universal rules by which states are governed, even in
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On the other hand, violations of rules governing the conduct of
hostilities (such as the proportionality rule) are equally grounded
in considerations of humanity and are thus informed with the
same irreducible ethical character as is Common Article 3. Perhaps, as the leading contemporary commentator on international
humanitarian law has written:
It is inevitable that, in developing international law for internal armed conflicts, the central source for the rules will be the
principles of humanity. No self-respecting state would challenge the applicability of such principles in internal armed
conflict. More specific rules, such as proportionality, the prohibition of direct attack on civilians, the prohibition of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, the prohibition of
means and methods of warfare that cause unnecessary suffering, can and should be regarded as necessary and proper derivations from the principles of humanity.' 0 9
In other words, the long-standing nature of these fundamental
principles, taken together with their classification as quintessential "dictates of humanity," establishes their priority status within
the hierarchy of customary norms. Treatise law makes clear that
the quintessential injunctions codified in Common Article 3 and
Protocol II provide the cornerstone of modern human rights and
humanitarian law, by setting forth rules which are essential to
the continuation of a civilized international community. Accordingly, violators should be subject to universal jurisdiction as
hostes humani generis."1 0
As stated earlier, the Yugoslavian War Crimes Tribunal does
not explicitly adopt a jus cogens analysis. Instead, the Appeals
Chamber "extends" customary international humanitarian law to
internal conflicts on the basis of State practice and the perceived
"illegitimacy" of differentiating between internal and interstate
the absence of treaty obligations. Id.; William Walker, The InternationalLaw Applicable to
GuerrillaMovements in Internal Armed Conflicts: A Case Study of ContraAttacks on NicaraguanFarmingCooperatives, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 147, 152 (1988). Common Article 3 is used with elementary considerations of humanity to discern customary law. Id.
109 See MERON, supra note 106, at 74.
110 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1987). Universal
jurisdiction attaches for genocide, certain acts of terrorism and various traditional offenses
characterizing the perpetrators as enemies of all mankind. Id.; Randall, supra note 53, at
785. Universal jurisdiction extends to acts for which there is universal condemnation despite the lack of a nexus between the actors, the site of the offense and the prosecuting
nation. Id.; Jean-Marie Simon, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Justice or Show Trials?, 11 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 1, 44-45 (1993). Universal jurisdiction is permissive and not mandatory. Id.
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wars in light of the ultimate objective of all law, which is to protect
human beings.
Had the Tribunal relied on ajus cogens analysis, however, the
relationship between upholding human rights and international
peace and security perhaps would have been clearer. As discussed
above, the policy foundations behind establishing a hierarchy of
international human rights stem from the existence of a narrow
compass of rights violations which threaten peaceful coexistence
in an international community.1 1 1 Upholding these rights in
armed conflict is a necessary and proper means of maintaining a
stable world order.
There is a further aspect of the Tribunal's ruling which,
although not explicitly explored by the Appeals Chamber, was
clearly of moment. This aspect involved the applicability of a
criminal standard over human rights violations even in the absence of State action or policy. It is manifest in this regard that
Common Article 3, like Protocol II, may be applied not only to
agents of the State but to the insurgents. In this connection, treatises interpreting crimes against humanity under Article 6(c) of
the Nuremberg Charter had concluded that criminal responsibility vests only where individual action is supported by a State action or policy as an element of the offense.1 12
The recent ruling in Tadic clearly points out that violations of
fundamental human rights in armed conflict may support criminal jurisdiction even in the absence of State involvement." 3 The
111 See Parker & Nylon, supra note 12, at 414-16 (noting that incorporating jus cogens
into domestic actions helps to protect human rights).
112 Nuremberg Charter,supra note 37, art. 6(c). The Tribunal had jurisdiction to punish
persons guilty of certain offenses who acted in the "interest of the European Axis countries." Id. See M. CHERIF BAsSIouNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 261 (1992). Crimes against Humanity are governed by Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter. Id. Primarily prohibited are "murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecution on political, racial and religious
grounds and other inhumane acts." Id.
113 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1996). In a case brought by victims of
war crimes seeking tort compensation under the Alien Tort Claims Act, the court held that
"certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting
under the auspices of a state or only as a private individual." Id.; see also William Aceves,
Affirming the Law of Nations in U.S. Courts: The Karadzic Litigation and the Yugoslav
Conflict, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 137, 138 (1996). The author notes the significance in finding non-state liability in this context. Id.; Thomas G. Larussa, Second Circuit Holds That
Individuals Can Be Liable for Violating InternationalLaw: Alien Torts Claims Act Applies
to Individuals as Well as States; Torture Victime Protection Act Applies to Unrecognized
States, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 558, 561 (1996). International law includes individuals as well
as states. Id.
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Tribunal's interpretation is clearly consistent with the modern development of international law and with generally accepted standards for the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Individual criminal responsibility historically existed for those acts which the
international community viewed as heinous and inherently inimical to its collective well-being, even in the absence of treaty or
other international agreement. The Commissioner of Experts for
Rwanda was keenly aware of this aspect of international penal
law, as is made clear in its Report detailing the historical applicability of international criminal norms to such activities as slave114
trading, slave-trafficking and piracy.
The direct applicability of international norms to individual responsibility (largely made possible by the rise of jus cogens) has
profound implications for the future growth of international law.
Clearly the punishment of non-State agents acting exclusively
within an internal setting was previously thought to be the unique
province of States. Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni linked crimes
against humanity to a State action or a policy requirement, resulting from his concern that in the absence of such a condition, the
municipal jurisdiction of States within the modern system would
1 5
be impermissibly disturbed.
The centrality of fundamental human rights principles to the
international order mandates that these norms have primacy and
direct effect insofar as individuals and groups are concerned. Disintermediation by States, the creation of an essentially dualistic
interpretation of international law, cannot be allowed to condition
the realization of peremptory norms in the world community.
Rather, the principles represented by jus cogens must receive pri114 See Report of the Commission of Experts Pursuantto Security Council Resolution 780,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex at 3, U.N. Doc. S/199411405, 27 (1994); see also Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980). The court found after the review of the work of
jurists and commentators that official torture can be classified as violative of the law of
nations. Id. It also noted the significance of The Paquette Habana in that the court there
transformed a traditional prohibition against seizing non-combat ships during warfare into
a settled international norm. Id. at 881.
115 BAssiouNi, supra note 112, at 247. But see Christopher C. Joyner, Enforcing Human
Rights Standards in the Former Yugoslavia: The Case for an International War Crimes
Tribunal, 22 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 235, 240 (1994) (noting that cardinal principle of
Nuremberg precedent is that human rights prevail over municipal law); Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretationof the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation:From
Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 358 (1994) (arguing
that international law can be manipulated if left to municipal law, thereby changing its
character).
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ority as a matter of international public policy if peaceful coexistence within an international order of any sort is to continue.
The growing acceptance of jus cogens, however, and the direct
application of international criminal law to individual violators
parallels the monistic approach to human rights enforcement
which is clearly espoused by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic.
Rather than treating the upheavals caused by systematic violations of Common Article 3 as the unique province of States merely
because the misconduct is internal, international law now seeks to
apply peremptory norms directly. As noted by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic, distinguishing between international and internal
wars makes little sense from a policy standpoint if it is primarily
human beings (and not abstracts like the sovereign) who are the
ultimate beneficiaries of humanitarian jurisprudence.
The Tribunal thus implicitly adopts a monistic interpretation of
international law in formulating its underlying rationale for deciding Dusko Tadic's appeal. The pre-existing view that maintaining collective peace and security is best achieved by regulating the
relationship between States has been tentatively superseded. The
new approach favored emphasizes the relationship between States
and military aggregates on the one hand, and individuals and
groups on the other. By "piercing" the sovereign form and upholding the human rights of individuals and groups, international law
now seeks to realize the ideal of collective security.
The monist theory of international law has had no more forceful
advocate than Hersch Lauterpacht. The distinguishing feature of
this theory is the "supremacy of international law, even within the
municipal sphere."1 16 Accordingly, international human rights
and humanitarian norms are not viewed as receiving exclusive or
116 See BROWNLIE, supra note 9, at 33 (citing H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HuMAN RIGHTS (1950)). International law need not be expressly adopted to be part of municipal law. Id. at 11. It becomes applicable to individuals through a transference into
municipal law. Id.; Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of InternationalLegalprudence, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 198 (1993). Whereas dualistic models focus on international law, monistic views recognize international law as possessing independent legal authority that automatically permeates municipal law. Id.; see also Jacob Dollinger, Brazilian
Supreme Court Solutions for Conflicts Between Domestic and InternationalLaw: An Exercise in Eclecticism, 22 CAP. U. L. REv. 1041, 1046 (1993). A radical view of monist theory
believes in the application of international law to the complete exclusion of contradictory
municipal law. Id.; Antonio Mendoza, The Creeping Breach of InternationalLaw, 16 Loy.
L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 107, 109-110 (1993). The way in which treaties are received are
greatly influenced by a monist theory state which incorporates, without hesitation, the language of the treaty as part of its municipal law. Id.
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even primary application under national law; rather, human
rights achieve primacy and direct effect insofar as the individual
and groups are concerned. Sir Ian Brownlie has characterized the
"absolute" monist position in the following terms:
The State is disliked as an abstraction and distrusted as a
vehicle for maintaining human rights; international law, like
municipal law, is ultimately concerned with the conduct and
welfare of individuals. International law is seen as the best
available moderator of human affairs, and also as a logical
condition of the legal existence of States and therefore of the
municipal systems
of law within the sphere and competence
7
of States."1
The integration of the law of peace with a monist conception of
international human rights and humanitarian norms, however, is
what informs the new humanitarian order with its special character. The movement toward such an order is deeply influenced by
the Red Cross concept of peace which is fundamentally linked to
human rights and a concern for progressive social and human development. The Red Cross concept of peace postulates that peace
is not simply the absence of war, but constitutes a process occurring among states and peoples of the world community founded on
a respect for freedom and equality of human rights and a "fair and
equitable distribution of resources according to peoples' needs.""'

117

See

BROWNLIE,

supra note 9, at 33; Rachael E. Schwartz, Chaos, Oppression, and

Rebellion: The Use of Self-Help to Secure Individual Rights Under InternationalLaw, 12

B.U. INT'L L.J. 255, 305 (1994). A similar perspective views states not as untrustworthy to
protect human rights, but rather as less capable of effectively administering human rights
law. Id.; see also Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role ofInternationalLaw as a Canon ofDomestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1127-28 (1990). The harshness of com-

mandeering debated and analyzed municipal law as urged by monist theorists is lessened
when one considers that international law evolves over long periods of time with the help of
commentators and jurists scrutinizing it at every level. Id.
118 HAUG, supra note 69, at 686. See Alexandre Hay, Conference-The American Red
Cross-WashingtonCollege of Law Conference: InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 31 Am.

U. L. REv. 811, 816 (1982). One of the main principles of the Red Cross is humanity and
peace and the peace process is successful only when these two principles converge. Id.;
John H.E. Fried, The United Nations' Report to Establish a Right of the Peoples to Peace, 2

Y.B. INT'L L. 21, 23 n.10 (1990). A definition of peace is alluded to here, which was
established at the Belgrade Conference of the International Committee of the Red Cross
and later confirmed at another meeting of the Committee. Id. The baseline for the definition is that peace is based on the interplay of the concepts of freedom, independence, national sovereignty, equality, human rights and a fair and equitable distribution of resources. Id. at 23.
PACE
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TOWARDS A NEW HUMANITARIAN ORDER

The new outlook eschews the traditional or negative definition
of peace which stresses the law of aggression (the jus ad bellum)
and conceives of peace only as the absence of military force.
Rather, the new humanitarian order (which this essay has identified with the emerging concept of peace) seeks to maintain international peace and security through direct recourse to human
rights and humanitarian norms. These norms include the individual and collective right to economic and social development and
"better standards of life in a larger freedom." 119
The contextual relationship between human rights and humanitarian norms on the one hand and world peace on the other is precisely the area where the Tadic appeal is not sufficiently detailed.
The Tribunal effectively overlooks a vital element of the jurisprudence it is to apply by deferring mechanically to the Security
Council's discretion. The failure of the Tribunal to orient its pronouncements on international humanitarian law to the evolving
law of peace must be perceived as a drawback in an otherwise constructive and far-reaching achievement.
This essay has recommended not a modification to the Tribunal's approach, but an elaboration upon it. A central thrust of
modern international humanitarian law is dissemination of the
ideals which underlie its operative provisions. Ideals which the
international community does not have a sincere desire to uphold,
however, will be thrust aside in the practical world. That cannot
be allowed to occur in the former Yugoslavia. As Hartley Shawcross has so eloquently asserted, lasting peace depends on those
ideals being observed. 120

119 HAUG, supra note 69, at 586.
120 See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALs 634-39 (1992) (noting

that Nuremberg War Crimes Trials were essentially "idealistic prosecution[s]," attempting
to establish norms which would influence conduct of future belligerents).

